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A B S T R A C T
Within research into neurodevelopmental disorders, little is known about the mechanisms underpinning changes
in symptom severity across development. When the behavioural presentation of a condition improves/symptoms
lessen, this may be because core underlying atypicalities in cognition/neural function have ameliorated. An
alternative possibility is ‘compensation’; that the behavioural presentation appears improved, despite persisting
deﬁcits at cognitive and/or neurobiological levels. There is, however, currently no agreed technical deﬁnition of
compensation or its behavioural, cognitive and neural characteristics. Furthermore, its workings in neurode-
velopmental disorders have not been studied directly. Here, we review current evidence for compensation in
neurodevelopmental disorders, using Autism Spectrum Disorder as an example, in order to move towards a
better conceptualisation of the construct. We propose a transdiagnostic framework, where compensation re-
presents the processes responsible for an observed mismatch between behaviour and underlying cognition in a
neurodevelopmental disorder, at any point in development. Further, we explore potential cognitive and neural
mechanisms driving compensation and discuss the broader relevance of the concept within research and clinical
settings.
1. Introduction
Much research into neurodevelopmental disorders has focused on
uncovering the cognitive and neurobiologial atypicalities that underlie
the deﬁning behavioural symptoms of the condition in question. In the
case of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), numerous cognitive theories
(e.g., deﬁcient ‘theory of mind’, ‘weak central coherence’; see Frith,
2012) have been proposed to account for the social and non-social
symptoms that are characteristic of the condition. And yet, across
neurodevelopmental disorders and pertinent in the case of ASD, there is
great heterogeneity in the degree to which symptoms lessen, persist or
even worsen across the lifetime. The mechanisms by which the beha-
vioural presentation of a condition might alter across development re-
main largely elusive. For example, in the case of ASD, there currently
exists no empirically-grounded explanation pertaining to why some
autistic children no longer fulﬁl diagnostic criteria by adulthood and
likewise, why some autistic individuals do not present with clinically
impairing symptoms until adulthood.
It is tempting to assume that any signiﬁcant improvement in the
behavioural presentation of a neurodevelopmental condition has come
about due to some alteration or alleviation of atypical underlying
cognition and/or neural function. In an authoritative opinion piece on
the last 25 years of research into ASD and developmental dyslexia, Uta
Frith highlighted that “it is still not clear what causes these changes and
wide variations [in behavioural symptoms]…but compensation makes
it possible to disguise persisting problems” (2013, p. 670). This begs the
question; what is compensation and how can we measure it? Within the
ﬁeld of neurodevelopmental disorders, the phenomenon remains rela-
tively abstract and ill-deﬁned, such that numerous, potentially over-
lapping terminologies have been used in the literature (e.g., in ASD,
camouﬂaging/masking, Lai et al., 2016; compensatory learning, Frith,
1991; adaptation, Johnson et al., 2015b), but the construct has never
been directly studied in its own right. Nevertheless, the importance of
understanding compensation in neurodevelopmental phenotypes is
clear. First, given increasing interest in studying previously conceived
‘childhood’ disorders, such as ASD and Attention Deﬁcit Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD), across the whole lifespan, including how disorder
presentation might change over time (for ASD, see Georgiades et al.,
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2017), developmentally-relevant mechanisms for improvement, in-
cluding compensation, should be an important focus of research.
Second, compensation could be a useful way to unpick some of the
heterogeneity amongst neurodevelopmental disorders, which is fre-
quently proposed to be one of the greatest challenges to understanding
these conditions (Thapar et al., 2017). Finally, studying the mechan-
isms underlying compensation could be fundamental to informing early
intervention research, whose principle aim is to improve long-term
prognosis. And yet, in order to directly investigate compensation, we
must have a reasonable deﬁnition to guide our measurements and de-
rive testable hypotheses.
In this paper, we aim to create a working deﬁnition of compensation
relevant to neurodevelopmental disorders and use this deﬁnition to i)
review evidence for compensation, garnering examples from ASD, ii)
propose a preliminary framework of the workings of compensation, iii)
explore its potential cognitive and neural underpinnings, and ﬁnally,
iv) discuss the research and clinical implications of studying neurode-
velopmental disorders within this compensation framework.
2. Deﬁning and measuring compensation in neurodevelopmental
disorders
2.1. Compensation in the psychological literature
Within psychological research in general, the term ‘compensation’
has been widely used. In instances where participants, who are ex-
pected to be limited in a particular set of resources (be this due to a
psychiatric condition, old age, or an experimental manipulation
amongst healthy participants), perform better than expected on a psy-
chological task, the possibility that they have in some way compen-
sated, is often speculated upon by authors. This compensatory hy-
pothesis is generally backed up by evidence showing that ‘compensated’
participants have achieved this ‘typical’ performance with the recruit-
ment of additional resources, be these neurobiological, cognitive, or
genetic. For example, in the literature on aging, researchers have used
the term to describe how older adults can demonstrate atypical acti-
vation (enhanced or decreased) of task-relevant brain areas or activa-
tion of additional regions not typically recruited by younger adults, in
order to perform a task just as well as their younger counterparts (see
Grady, 2012). Equally, within research into neuropsychological pa-
tients, the term ‘compensation’ refers to the brain’s ability to rely on
alternative neural routes after typical routes have been compromised by
brain damage, in order for patients to make improvements in beha-
viour/cognitive abilities (e.g., Price and Friston, 2002). The term
‘partial compensation’ is used to describe how an attempt to counteract
limited resources may not always be eﬃcient enough to support wholly
‘typical’ behaviour or cognitive task performance.
Despite frequent use of the term ‘compensation’, there is no tech-
nical or universal deﬁnition. The precise interpretation of its meaning
or the meaning of ‘compensatory brain activity’ is speciﬁc to the par-
ticular task and participant population in question. The literature also
suggests that the process of compensation could actually exist and op-
erate at multiple levels, from molecular and/or genetic pathways (for
instance, synaptic plasticity in order to counteract atypical con-
nectivity; e.g., in ASD, Bourgeron, 2015) to broader cognitive systems
and behaviour (for instance, atypical neural functioning to support
typical cognitive task performance; e.g., in ASD, White et al., 2014). In
this paper, due to the complexity and novelty of the phenomenon, we
will focus on conceptualising compensation across levels of behaviour,
cognition and whole neural networks only, solely within the scope of
neurodevelopmental disorders.
2.2. Compensation in the literature on neurodevelopmental disorders
With no agreed deﬁnition, it is unsurprising that compensation in
neurodevelopmental disorders has received little empirical attention.
There is, to our knowledge, only one review paper on the topic (Ullman
and Pullman, 2015), which explores the speciﬁc compensatory function
of the declarative memory system in ﬁve neurodevelopmental dis-
orders, including ASD. Crucially, the authors’ review relies on a deﬁ-
nition of compensation that is reminiscent of that described in the aging
and neuropsychological literature; that compensation reﬂects how an
intact neurocognitive process/system might take over, or compensate
for, the functioning of a defective process/system in order to maintain
typical behaviour and/or cognitive task performance. Indeed, Ullman
and Pullman (2015) suggest that in ASD, where socio-cognitive func-
tioning is compromised, intact declarative memory ability may scaﬀold
social behaviour; for example, the ability to recall previously learned
social rules may replace intuitive understanding of social cues, thereby
contributing to an appropriate social response.
There is, however, good reason to question whether a deﬁnition
derived from the study of individuals who have acquired their deﬁcits
(e.g., brain-damaged individuals/aging adults), necessarily extends to
neurodevelopmental populations (Johnson, 2017; Thomas and
Karmiloﬀ-Smith, 2002). For example, Johnson (2017) has highlighted
how focal brain damage during the pre/perinatal period may be com-
pensated for by early reallocation of function to intact brain regions,
but that in the case of conditions such as ASD, where more wide-spread
early brain disturbance is observed (or postulated, e.g., general synapse
dysfunction), an alternative explanation of compensation may be re-
quired. Additionally, brain injury in healthy adults may trigger a host of
compensatory processes (e.g., enhanced connectivity from damaged to
frontal regions; Sharp et al., 2014) that are not necessarily comparable
to cases where a cascade of atypical neural function has existed from
very early in development.
In our endeavor to ﬁnd a deﬁnition of compensation drawn from
observations in neurodevelopmental phenotypes, we take inspiration
from research into a developmental condition that has a relatively
circumscribed cognitive deﬁcit and has received some preliminary
discussion with regards to compensation; namely developmental dys-
lexia.
2.3. Lessons from developmental dyslexia
Developmental dyslexia is characterised by a speciﬁc impairment in
reading, not otherwise accounted for by intellectual or visual abilities
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The condition is proposed to
be underpinned by a core deﬁcit in phonological processing (Snowling,
2014), which contributes to an array of behavioural symptoms amongst
dyslexics (e.g., spelling errors and slow reading and word recognition;
Thambirajah, 2010). Critically, although the majority of children with
dyslexia experience these diﬃculties persistently (Hatcher et al., 2002;
Maughan et al., 2009), a subset of individuals, referred to as ‘com-
pensated dyslexics’ (Leﬂy and Pennington, 1991), eventually establish
typical reading skills by the time they enter adulthood (Callens et al.,
2012; Gallagher et al., 1996).
In principle, there are at least three possible ways in which dyslexic
individuals’ primary symptoms could lessen. First, the phonological
processing deﬁcit at the cognitive level may genuinely remit, thus
supporting good reading ability. Second, phonological processing may
be delayed rather than deﬁcient in these children, so that there is
eventually developmental ‘catch up’. Third, good reading ability may
be facilitated by alternative neurocognitive pathways that are in-
dependent of phonological routes. On inspection of the literature, the
ﬁrst two possibilities do not appear to hold up empirically. Amongst
highly ‘compensated’ dyslexics, who do not exhibit measurable spelling
or reading diﬃculties (e.g., those in higher education), signiﬁcant
phonological processing deﬁcits are revealed when tapped with sensi-
tive enough cognitive probes, such as rapid picture naming (Gallagher
et al., 1996; Ingvar et al., 2002; Parrila et al., 2007; Swanson, 2012).
Further, these individuals’ reading abilities are not necessarily com-
parable to those of typically developing individuals under certain
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contexts; for example, their reading speeds are signiﬁcantly slower than
typically developing individuals’ when put under a time constraint
(Parrila et al., 2007), or when exposed to substantial background noise
(Varnet et al., 2016).
A more plausible explanation is that ‘typical’ reading ability is
achieved via one or more atypical routes that bypass phonological
processing. These alternative processes may be suﬃcient in certain
contexts, but ultimately, are not as ﬁne-tuned as phonologically-based
routes to reading. This is in line with empirical ﬁndings and self-reports
of alternative cognitive strategies amongst dyslexics; for example, ﬁt-
ting the orthographic forms of unfamiliar words to familiar ones where
spelling of the two is similar (Cavalli et al., 2016; Parrila et al., 2007)
and relying upon visual imagery (Bacon and Handley, 2014) and the
semantic context of words (Corkett and Parrila, 2008; Pugh et al.,
2001). This notion of non-phonological routes to ‘typical’ reading is
further corroborated by evidence at the neural level, such as ﬁndings of
neural signatures that are unique to ‘compensated’ (versus ‘un-
compensated’) dyslexics when performing phonological tasks (Ingvar
et al., 2002; Shaywitz et al., 2003). Amongst ‘compensated’ dyslexics,
neuroimaging ﬁndings generally support hypoactivation of areas im-
plicated in phonological function, e.g., left parieto- and occito-temporal
areas (Cao et al., 2008; Hoeft et al., 2007), and hyperactivation of ad-
ditionally recruited areas, e.g., right inferior frontal gyrus (Hoeft et al.,
2011; Shaywitz et al., 2004). Greater functional connectivity between
posterior visual regions has also been reported (Koyama et al., 2013),
perhaps reﬂecting the potential compensatory role of visual strategies
(for an exhaustive review of compensatory neural pathways, see
Pammer, 2014).
2.4. Working deﬁnition of compensation
Developmental dyslexia is a particularly useful model from which to
guide a working deﬁnition of compensation as it is one of the few
neurodevelopmental conditions in which the underlying cognitive
deﬁcit can be measured fairly accurately (even in so-called ‘compen-
sated’ adults), thereby allowing for distinct measurements of behaviour
and cognition. This is important as the developmental dyslexia litera-
ture suggests that compensation signiﬁes some discrepancy between the
perceived ability of an individual, exhibited in their behaviour (i.e.,
degree of observable symptoms), and actual ability, exhibited in un-
derlying cognitive and/or neural function. Accordingly, our working
deﬁnition of compensation is as follows: the processes contributing to
improved behavioural presentation of a neurodevelopmental disorder, de-
spite persisting core deﬁcit(s) at cognitive and/or neurobiological levels. This
deﬁnition is intentionally general (i.e. transdiagnostic), whilst still
making qualitative predictions about what lies at behavioural, cognitive
and/or neural levels.
The principal proposal of this deﬁnition is that compensation con-
tributes to a mismatch between behaviour and the relevant under-
pinning cognition, whereby a ‘compensated’ individual’s behavioural
presentation is better than would otherwise be expected based on their
underlying cognitive proﬁle. The mechanism of compensation, there-
fore, contrasts with instances where behaviour and cognition remain
matched, for example, where behaviour improves due to a real les-
sening of the core underlying deﬁcit (i.e., genuine remission). A special
case of the latter would be delayed maturation (see Table 1), whereby a
cognitive ability is delayed in ‘coming online’. We suggest that in cases
of delayed maturation, the underlying ability eventually becomes
neurotypical, although its late emergence may leave ‘scars’ because a
critical window has been missed in development; for example, con-
nections with typical sensory inputs may not wire in the usual way.
However, in contrast to compensation, we would expect those in-
dividuals whose cognitive ability matured late to show improvement
not only in behaviour but also in their underlying cognitive proﬁle,
albeit atypically. Critically, we predict that a ‘compensated’ person, i.e.,
an individual that appears to be doing well, is not necessarily exhibiting Ta
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a milder form of their condition. Instead, severe and persistent under-
lying deﬁcits may exist, but these are masked by the presence of a
substantial amount of compensation (Frith, 2004).
In conceiving compensation as the processes contributing to a be-
haviour-cognition mismatch, the critical obstacle to investigating the
phenomenon within neurodevelopmental disorders, which are for the
most part diagnosed by behaviour alone, becomes strikingly clear. The
behavioural presentation of a disorder arises from the combination (and
possible interaction) of both core cognitive deﬁcits and the compen-
satory processes that have taken place to ameliorate the expression of
these deﬁcits, at any point in development. Fig. 1 depicts theoretically
what the implications of this might be, by presenting ﬁve hypothetical
individuals (A–E) within a neurodevelopmental population, each with
their own degree of i) core cognitive deﬁcit, ii) behavioural symptoms
and iii) compensation.
First, the extent of the cognitive deﬁcit is not systematically related
to the degree of symptom severity, i.e., there is a clear mismatch be-
tween behaviour and cognition. Second, two individuals can appear
behaviourally ‘identical’ despite very diﬀerent doses of deﬁcit and
compensation (A and C). Equally, two individuals can have equally
severe deﬁcits but appear substantially diﬀerent in behaviour, due to
varying amounts of compensation (A and B). Third, an individual’s
symptoms may appear to have lessened, perhaps to the extent that they
no longer fulﬁl diagnostic criteria, despite a substantial core cognitive
deﬁcit (D). Fourth, those with a double hit of a severe deﬁcit and also
poor ability/propensity to compensate will appear the most behaviou-
rally severe (E).
It should be noted that the model in Fig. 1 assumes that the extent of
compensation taking place is independent of the degree of core cogni-
tive deﬁcit, thereby allowing for all possible combinations of the two. In
some cases, however, the ability to compensate may be limited by the
cognitive deﬁcit itself; for example, insight into one's own diﬃculties
might be necessary to trigger compensation. The ﬁgure also omits, for
simplicity, possible additional adverse risk factors that might contribute
to overall disorder presentation (e.g., low socio-economic status, ethnic
status, home chaos). Whilst these could be seen as factors that simply
strip away compensatory resources, adverse environments may also
directly inﬂuence disorder presentation (i.e., interact with the
expression of underlying deﬁcits in behaviour), for example, by in-
creasing vulnerability to further stress/adversity or substantiating re-
sistance to future adversity (Rutter, 2006, 2012).
2.5. Measuring compensation
According to our working deﬁnition, a purely behavioural tool
would be insuﬃcient for measuring compensation, as the very deﬁni-
tion reﬂects the disparity between behavioural and cognitive levels. For
the purpose of research, our measurement tool must be able to disen-
tangle the contributions of core cognitive deﬁcit and compensation to
the behavioural presentation of the disorder. This will, as demonstrated
by the literature on developmental dyslexia, require highly sensitive
and, ideally, process-pure cognitive probes that are not dependent on
the symptoms themselves. Further, our cognitive tasks should be able to
detect subtle diﬃculties in even the most intellectually able of in-
dividuals. Indeed, well-compensated, highly able individuals may de-
monstrate reasonable performance on cognitive tasks aiming to tap the
deﬁcit in question, but this might come at the cost of time and/or other
cognitive resources (Frith, 2013). Future research into compensation
might therefore beneﬁt from more ﬁne-grained data collection, such as
the speed of task performance or the eﬀects of dual task interference.
3. Evidence for compensation in ASD
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a set of neurodevelopmental
conditions characterised by social and communication impairments and
repetitive and restricted behaviours and interests (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). One prominent explanation of the social symptoms
in ASD posits a core cognitive deﬁcit in theory of mind (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2000), which is the propensity to infer spontaneously what others
are thinking in order to predict and explain their behaviour (Happé,
2015). As there is evidence to suggest that cognitive and neural aty-
picalities associated with ASD may contribute diﬀerentially to the social
and non-social symptoms (Happé et al., 2006), we will here focus on
observations of compensation in the social domain only; where in-
dividuals’ social symptoms appear improved, despite persistence in an
underlying theory of mind deﬁcit.
We should note that theory of mind is just one example of a socio-
cognitive ability that may be atypical in ASD (see Happé et al., 2017),
which we use here for the purpose of simplifying our model. This could
in theory be substituted for other socio-cognitive probes or biological
markers that underpin social symptoms in ASD. Traditionally, theory of
mind tasks require participants to attribute mental states to others (e.g.,
that someone holds a false belief about the world) in verbal vignettes
(e.g., Strange Stories; Happé, 1994), pictures/cartoons/animated
shapes (e.g., Frith-Happé Animations; Abell et al., 2000), or naturalistic
videos (e.g., Strange Stories Films Task; Murray et al., 2017). Explicit
theory of mind tasks usually require participants to answer questions
about what the characters think, while implicit tasks measure, e.g.,
anticipatory eye movements during a false belief scenario, without a
direct mental state question. We have identiﬁed four themes in ASD
where we suggest compensation is relevant: i) good outcome, ii) at-risk
individuals transitioning away from the autism phenotype, iii) late di-
agnosis, and iv) female autism presentation.
3.1. Good outcome
Individuals diagnosed with ASD in childhood who go on to achieve
‘good outcome’ have been described as showing remarkable compen-
sation (Frith, 2013). These are, according to a body of longitudinal and
retrospective studies, the subset of individuals on the autism spectrum
who, by adulthood, display markedly reduced autistic symptoms
(Farley et al., 2009; Helles et al., 2015; Lord et al., 2015; Magiati et al.,
2014; Seltzer et al., 2004) and achieve a degree of success in terms
of educational/occupational status, independence, and social
Fig. 1. Visual representation of compensation, where A–E represent ﬁve hypothetical
individuals with a given neurodevelopmental disorder. The black weights represent the
extent of core cognitive deﬁcit associated with that disorder (e.g., in ASD, theory of mind
deﬁcit). Larger weights (10g) versus smaller weights (1g) represent greater severity of the
cognitive deﬁcit. The balloons represent the extent of compensation that has taken place.
Larger versus smaller balloons represent a greater degree of compensation. The vertical
dashed arrows represent the extent of improvement in the behavioural presentation of the
disorder/lessening of symptoms. The higher the vertical dashed arrow extends upwards,
the greater the improvement in the behavioural presentation of the disorder. The hor-
izontal dashed line represents a hypothetical diagnostic cut-oﬀ, below which symptoms
are suﬃciently impairing to meet criteria for a diagnosis and above which, diagnostic
criteria are not met.
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relationships (Billstedt et al., 2005; Eaves and Ho, 2008; Farley et al.,
2009). We do note, however, that the majority of studies into adult
outcome thus far rely heavily on deﬁnitions of outcome imposed by
neurotypicals to neurotypical standards, and may not necessarily reﬂect
the best outcomes as perceived by autistic individuals themselves.
These studies to date consider ‘good outcome’ to have occurred, when
autistic individuals appear, at least on the surface, to be experiencing a
less impairing version of the condition. A similar pattern is seen
amongst other neurodevelopmental disorders, including developmental
dyslexia, as discussed earlier, and ADHD. For example, a third of chil-
dren with ADHD no longer exhibit clinically impairing symptoms by
adulthood (Faraone et al., 2006). Crucially, if this ‘good outcome’ has
arisen despite persistence in underlying core cognitive deﬁcits, rather
than because these deﬁcits have genuinely resolved, these individuals
represent a subgroup that ﬁt our aforementioned deﬁnition of com-
pensation.
There is good reason to suspect that autistic adults with ‘good
outcome’, who typically show good intellectual and language abilities,
continue to have characteristically autistic cognitive proﬁles, despite
displaying “[social] behaviour that more and more shades into nor-
mality” (Frith, 1991, p. 31). Socially adapted behaviour might be
achieved via overt and conscious strategies, despite core socio-cognitive
abilities, such as theory of mind, remaining impaired. For example, an
individual may be taught to make eye contact without necessarily being
able to extract mental state information from that eye contact. Further,
there is evidence to suggest that logical ‘hacking’ and intact verbal
abilities might facilitate success on explicit theory of mind tasks that
directly ask participants to reason about mental states, in both children
(e.g., Cantio et al., 2016; Happé, 1995; Peterson et al., 2007; Scheeren
et al., 2013) and adults (Lever and Geurts, 2016a; Senju et al., 2009).
Such strategies, however, cannot support performance on more sensi-
tive, implicit measures of theory of mind (e.g., anticipatory eye gaze
based on attribution of a false belief), in which persistent diﬃculties are
revealed (Senju et al., 2009; Schneider et al., 2013). This notion of a
fundamental and enduring diﬃculty in understanding others’ minds is
further highlighted by the fact that in situations where learned strate-
gies may not be suﬃcient to fully compensate, such as novel, fast-paced
everyday social interactions, even ‘good outcome’ individuals report
diﬃculty ‘keeping up’.
Evidence for a substantial mismatch between observable social be-
haviour and underlying theory of mind, as described above, amongst
autistic individuals who otherwise appear socially adapted casts doubt
on claims that some autistic people may genuinely transition oﬀ the
autism spectrum; for instance, in research describing children who
reach ‘optimal outcome’ after early behavioural intervention (Fein
et al., 2013; Helt et al., 2008). These studies report on individuals who
had a reliable diagnosis of ASD in childhood yet by young adulthood
are indistinguishable from their typically developing peers, even in the
absence of any additional support. The extent to which these in-
dividuals are showing compensation in the face of continuing under-
lying diﬃculties, rather than a genuine ‘remission’ of ASD, is yet to be
explored. Crucially, the underlying socio-cognitive proﬁle of these in-
dividuals has not been empirically investigated. However, reports of
continued social awkwardness and reduced quality of friendships
(Orinstein et al., 2015) suggest that these individuals continue to ex-
perience signiﬁcant social diﬃculties. This points to a broader issue
within research into outcome in ASD, which has predominantly relied
upon behavioural measures. If we are to gain a better understanding of
compensation amongst these highly able individuals, a closer, more in-
depth look at the discrepancy between behavioural and cognitive out-
comes will be required.
3.2. At-risk individuals transitioning away from the autism phenotype
The prospective study of infants at high genetic and/or environ-
mental risk for ASD (those with an older sibling with an ASD diagnosis)
has demonstrated that a substantial proportion (20%) of these in-
dividuals will also go on to follow an autism trajectory (Elsabbagh and
Johnson, 2010). Of particular interest to the notion of compensation,
are those at-risk siblings who, despite displaying some early ‘red ﬂags’
for autism at 12 months of age (for review, see Jones et al., 2014), are
indistinguishable from typically developing individuals in terms of so-
cial and communicative behaviour by 3 years of age. For example,
Macari et al. (2012) found this trajectory amongst 9% of their sample of
at-risk siblings. To the extent that these early behavioural markers re-
liably predict later ASD diagnosis, rather than broader developmental
issues (e.g., ADHD, cognitive impairment), these individuals might re-
present some form of early, unconscious compensation, which buﬀers
against the expression of ASD in behaviour.
Johnson et al. (2015b) have proposed that, in the face of substantial
risk for ASD in early development, a series of adaptive/compensatory
neural processes might take place, thereby reducing the severity of
autistic symptoms manifested in behaviour later on. This may be to the
extent that certain individuals bypass an autism diagnosis altogether.
Equally, the most severe symptom presentations might signal a very
limited capacity for this early neural compensation, which Johnson
(2012) suggests is rooted in the availability of prefrontal cortex (PFC)
based executive functions. This standpoint poses an intriguing theore-
tical possibility concerning the broader autism phenotype (BAP), which
is the sub-clinical expression of autistic traits, often seen in relatives of
those with ASD (Sucksmith et al., 2011). Traditionally, BAP has been
explained in terms of unaﬀected relatives having a milder ‘hit’ for ASD
(e.g., milder theory of mind deﬁcit) compared to their aﬀected relative,
which keeps them below the diagnostic threshold. However, reframing
this in light of compensation, opens up the possibility that in some
cases, unaﬀected relatives may not necessarily possess a milder cogni-
tive burden for ASD per se, but instead, possess a greater capacity to
compensate for this cognitive burden (Skuse, 2007), resulting in an
apparently milder behavioural presentation. This does not exclude the
possibility, which is indeed the prevailing view, that many relatives
express a milder phenotype due to genuinely milder underlying autistic
diﬃculties.
In order to assess the extent to which unaﬀected siblings might in
some cases be exceptional at compensating, one could investigate a
cognitive probe or biological marker shared amongst individuals with
ASD and their siblings (i.e., an endophenotype), which signals some
kind of aetiological load or ‘hit’ for ASD (here we have focused on
theory of mind impairment, but other examples could include atten-
tional abnormalities or EEG markers; see Jones et al., 2014). Com-
pensation could be inferred when so called ‘unaﬀected’ siblings are
demonstrating a typical behavioural proﬁle, in spite of the presence of a
cognitive deﬁcit or biological marker characteristic of those with di-
agnosed ASD. By contrast, unaﬀected siblings who appear typical in
terms of the cognitive characteristic/biological marker of interest,
would likely not be compensating, but rather, showing a typical be-
havioural proﬁle due to a genuine lack of ‘hit’ for ASD. Methods that
aim to quantify aetiological load for ASD within the general population
could help clarify this distinction between unaﬀected siblings who have
a lesser ‘hit’ for ASD versus those who are compensating in the face of a
substiantal ‘hit’; for example, siblings that are compensating should
demonstrate high common genetic risk for ASD. This could, for ex-
ample, be estimated using polygenic risk scores, which are based on
single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with the disorder in ques-
tion. Furthermore, it will be useful to determine if siblings can com-
pensate for rare genetic risk (e.g., de novo mutations) by investigating
the genetic patterns of all aﬀected/unaﬀected members of a family,
alongside cognitive/biological markers for ASD.
In the case of theory of mind, highly sensitive tasks will be required
to reveal subtle diﬃculties with mentalising in unaﬀected siblings.
Currently, there are only a few theory of mind tasks that are able to
capture individual diﬀerences in typically developing individuals (e.g.,
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition, Dziobek et al., 2006;
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Strange Stories Film Task, Murray et al., 2017; Adult-Theory of Mind,
Brewer et al., 2017). Continued longitudinal investigation of siblings
will also be required to clarify whether those who demonstrate early
autistic-like features that eventually disappear are genuinely compen-
sating for an underlying liability for ASD speciﬁcally, which might be
revealed with a cognitive or biological probe, or whether these ‘red
ﬂags’ in fact signal reversible social atypicalities, for example, due to
developmental delay.
3.3. Late diagnosis
Since the earliest reported cases over 70 years ago (Asperger, 1944
[translated in Frith, 1991]; Kanner, 1943), autism has been con-
ceptualised as a condition with childhood-onset. However, many in-
dividuals come for an ASD diagnosis for the ﬁrst time in adulthood
(Geurts and Jansen, 2012; Happé and Charlton, 2012; Lai and Baron-
Cohen, 2015). This is thought in part to mirror increasing public
awareness of ASD and a substantial widening of diagnostic criteria
(Hansen et al., 2015; Rutter, 2005). Additionally, the latest addition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-5
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), has for the ﬁrst time re-
cognised that autistic symptoms “may not become fully manifest until
social demands exceed limited capacities” (p. 50). Hence, the under-
lying assumption regarding ﬁrst diagnosis in adulthood, is that core
autistic diﬃculties have always existed for these individuals, but the
ability to compensate in some way has supported a relatively ‘neuro-
typical’ presentation, at least up until adulthood, where social demands
have exceeded compensatory ability. Alternatively, these individuals
diagnosed in adulthood may have exhibited some autistic behaviours
earlier in life, but these symptoms were not suﬃciently impairing for a
diagnosis. For example, certain individuals may construct a niche for
themselves that lessens the burden of their social diﬃculties (e.g.,
having a partner to act as their ‘social brain’, an employment en-
vironment that is low in social demands) and only when this niche is
disturbed do their autistic behaviours become impairing enough to seek
and warrant a diagnosis (see Section 4.2).
Demographically, this group of late diagnosed individuals are fairly
reminiscent of those ‘good outcome’ individuals ﬁrst diagnosed in
childhood. Studies from adult ASD clinics suggest up to 50% are em-
ployed or in higher education (Happé et al., 2016; Hofvander et al.,
2009) and 33–50% live independently (Hofvander et al., 2009;
Lehnhardt et al., 2016). Ascertaining whether a behaviour-cognition
mismatch truly characterised these individuals in earlier life, i.e. that
‘neurotypical’ behaviour masked core autistic diﬃculties, is challenging
as there are no studies to our knowledge that address, even retro-
spectively, what these adults looked like as children. However, anec-
dotal and qualitative reports from these individuals themselves suggest
that underlying diﬃculties were present long before the time of diag-
nosis; for example, in expressions of having felt diﬀerent or mis-
understood throughout their lives (e.g., Bargiela et al., 2016; Hickey
et al., 2017). Accurately quantifying compensation in this late diag-
nosed group will also require sensitive theory of mind tasks, where task
performance cannot rely on the very strategies that these individuals
may have developed to ‘cope’ without a diagnosis up until adulthood.
3.4. Female autism presentation
Although ASD has historically been a predominantly male condition
(Fombonne, 2009), there is mounting evidence to suggest that ASD may
be more prevalent in females than previously assumed (Lai et al., 2015;
Robinson et al., 2013). Females in general get diagnosed signiﬁcantly
later than their male counterparts (Begeer et al., 2013; Rutherford
et al., 2016) and are more likely to receive an alternative diagnosis
before ASD is conﬁrmed (Bargiela et al., 2016; Begeer et al., 2013). One
potential explanation (of several, see Lai et al., 2016) for later diagnosis
amongst females is that females with high autistic traits are less likely
to show clinically impairing symptoms due to a superior ability to
compensate (Dworzynski et al., 2012). Support for this notion comes
from cross-sectional observations that ASD symptom severity is
equivalent between males and females in childhood, yet by adulthood,
females display fewer social symptoms (Lai et al., 2011; Rynkiewicz
et al., 2016).
Clinical observations and self-reports also suggest that females may
be particularly motivated and/or skilled in ‘camouﬂaging’ their social
diﬃculties (Mandy and Tchanturia, 2015; Simone, 2010), although
these diﬃculties may continue to be experienced as impairing. Of in-
terest here, a recent qualitative investigation (Hull et al., 2017) into
‘camouﬂaging’ in autistic adults distinguishes masking and compensa-
tion as two sub-components of camouﬂaging; the former reﬂecting
suppression of autistic behaviours and the latter reﬂecting active stra-
tegies to support appearing ‘neurotypical’. Contrastingly, the frame-
work presented in this paper would encompass both of these instances
as compensation as they both ﬁt our deﬁnition of a discrepancy be-
tween behaviour and underlying cognitive ability. Instead, we distin-
guish between simpler and fairly inﬂexible methods (e.g., suppressing a
behaviour) with more sophisticated ones (e.g., explicitly developed
strategies to reason about mental states), in terms of the depth of
compensation (See Section 4.1).
Claims for advanced compensation in the female versus male autism
phenotype would be best supported by evidence for less severe beha-
vioural presentation in females versus males, despite equally severe
ASD-related cognitive and/or brain atypicalities. Additionally, if this
male-female disparity was found to be more distinct in older in-
dividuals, this would imply enhanced compensation in females devel-
oping across the lifetime. There has to our knowledge been only one
preliminary investigation of how the discrepancy between observed
behaviour and underlying cognition might diﬀer by sex. Lai et al.
(2016) explored the diﬀerence between standardised scores of ‘internal’
versus ‘external’ measures; theory of mind ability (inferred from per-
formance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task; Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001a) and self-rated Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001b) scores, versus observer-rated symptoms (Autism Diag-
nostic Observation Schedule [ADOS]; Lord et al., 2000). They con-
cluded that this diﬀerence, which they refer to as an ‘operationalised
camouﬂaging measure’, was greater for diagnosed females than males.
Further, a greater diﬀerence between internal and external levels, i.e., a
greater ‘camouﬂaging’ score, was associated with medial-temporal
based volume diﬀerences in the female brain only. The data showed
that there was no sex diﬀerence on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
task and instead, the male-female diﬀerence in ‘camouﬂaging’ scores
was driven by higher self-rated symptoms in females on the AQ, and
higher observer-rated symptoms in males on the ADOS. This supports
the notion that autistic females might appear less behaviourally severe
than males, despite equally severe doses of cognitive deﬁcit. We do,
however, draw attention to a potential issue with the use of the AQ as a
proxy of underlying cognitive diﬃculties, as higher AQ scores in au-
tistic females versus males may simply reﬂect greater awareness rather
than greater experience of underlying diﬃculties.
Studying the female versus male autism phenotype may be a useful
way to gain insight into the mechanisms involved in compensation. So
far, research has been limited (e.g., Lai et al., 2016) by the fact that
females in the clinic are more likely to have accompanying intellectual
and/or behavioural diﬃculties (Lai et al., 2015; van Wijngaarden-
Cremers et al., 2014). Furthermore, our diagnostic tools, derived pri-
marily from the study of autistic males, may be less sensitive to the
female autism phenotype (Rutter et al., 2003), thereby increasing the
chances of seriously under-estimating females’ behavioural impair-
ments. There is therefore a limited amount that could be discovered
about enhanced compensation in females by studying diagnosed in-
dividuals, who may be less likely to have compensatory resources due
to additional impairments. The most informative approach to identi-
fying successful female compensators may be through population-based
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studies (e.g., Brunsdon et al., 2015) of females who report high autistic
traits and demonstrate poor socio-cognitive abilities, but nevertheless
compensate suﬃciently for these diﬃculties so that they sit below the
diagnostic threshold for ASD. It is also possible that internalising pro-
blems experienced by autistic females may overshadow their autistic
symptoms in a clinical assessment, thus delaying the time it takes to
gain a diagnosis. This is particularly problematic if internalising
symptoms have arisen from the eﬀort of deliberately compensating in
the ﬁrst place.
4. Key characteristics of compensation
Consideration of the ASD literature has isolated four ASD-related
phenomena, as described in Section 3, which ﬁt our working deﬁnition
of compensation. This process has simultaneously highlighted other
potentially important characteristics of compensation that may con-
tribute to theory development. Here, we propose three hypothetical
features of compensation, with the aim of being able to unite fairly
discrete examples of compensation (good outcome, at-risk individuals
transitioning away from the autism phenotype, late diagnosis and fe-
male autism presentation) under one umbrella term, not only within
one speciﬁc neurodevelopmental disorder group, such as ASD, but also
in a transdiagnostic manner.
4.1. Compensation may be shallow or deep
Compensation is unlikely to be spread evenly, meaning that there
will be certain diﬃculties more easily compensated for than others
(Ullman and Pullman, 2015). For instance, in the case of ASD, learning
to laugh at a joke that relies on mental state understanding when others
do is much simpler than working out why the joke was funny in order to
formulate an appropriate social response. It is therefore conceivable
that the compensation sitting beneath the surface of ‘typical’ behaviour
could either be fairly shallow or instead could extend much deeper (see
Table 1). We suggest that ‘shallow compensation’ is akin to the use of a
white stick by the visually impaired. It enables one to avoid obstacles,
but does not go further in mimicking vision. By contrast, we suggest
that echolocation would be ‘deep compensation’ as it allows the for-
mation of a rich spatial representation (the end point of vision), albeit
via a diﬀerent route.
In ASD, examples of both shallow and deep compensation can be
identiﬁed. In terms of the former, there are strategies that allow one to
navigate the social world superﬁcially (e.g., making deliberate eye
contact, imitating others, inhibiting undesirable social behaviours).
These strategies are inﬂexible, do not work well in novel situations or
when social cues are especially ambiguous. Importantly, these strate-
gies do not support underlying socio-cognitive processes, i.e., they
would be unlikely to support intact performance on sensitive measures
of theory of mind. Moreover, we predict that shallow compensation is
fragile and can rapidly break down, particularly when compensatory
resources are limited, such as under stress, anxiety or mental fatigue.
Shallow compensation might explain why even those autistic in-
dividuals with ‘good outcome’, who score well on assessments of au-
tistic behaviours, often say they still struggle with day-to-day social
scenarios. The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord
et al., 2000), a standardised one-to-one assessment, may in fact provide
an optimal environment for compensation, since it involves structured
interaction with a trained researcher in a quiet space. However, across
multiple real-life social scenarios, the most diﬃcult aspect to compen-
sate for, i.e., a fundamental diﬃculty with intuitively understanding
other minds, will continue to present challenges for many autistic in-
dividuals with so-called ‘good outcome’, as demonstrated in persistent
diﬃculties with social relationships and meeting new people. Shallow
compensation may also partially explain why those receiving a late
diagnosis sometimes describe having ‘burnt out’, as shallow compen-
satory strategies become ineﬃcient to support day-to-day social
functioning in adulthood.
The possibility does remain that for certain autistic individuals,
compensation extends deeper. That is to say that genuinely sophisti-
cated alternative routes to good theory of mind performance might
exist. These routes are unlikely to use the usual computational ma-
chinery that allows eﬀortless representation of mental states in typically
developing individuals from the second year of life, but may still pro-
vide a suﬃcient, albeit slower, route to mental state attribution. For
instance, autistic individuals may rely on particular cognitive strengths,
such as detail-focused perception and exact memory (see Happé and
Frith, 2006), to process and analyse social information, although no
empirical research has been conducted on this to date. We predict that
deep compensation should be relatively more ﬂexible and resistant to
break down under stress and/or fatigue than shallow compensation.
Quantifying shallow compensation will require accurate measure-
ment of both autistic behaviour and underlying social cognition and
perhaps, exploration of how the severity of symptoms alters with the
changing demands of the environment. Ideally, numerous measures of
autistic behaviours across diﬀerent contexts should be taken into ac-
count. We might expect shallow-compensated individuals to show a
particularly uneven behavioural proﬁle across multiple contexts (e.g.,
research setting, home/work setting, novel scenarios). If shallow com-
pensation exists, then we should observe break down in certain con-
texts, when demands exceed compensatory ability. Quantifying deep
compensation, however, will prove particularly challenging, especially
if the supporting processes are sophisticated enough to support mental
state attribution, even in novel scenarios or relatively diﬃcult theory of
mind tasks. Instead, investigating the underlying neural signatures
(e.g., using fMRI or EEG) associated with good task performance might
prove particularly useful by shedding light on the nature of the alter-
native route to good task performance.
4.2. Compensation is modulated by the environment
The immediate environment may serve either to facilitate or impede
the workings of compensation. That is to say that the environment
might directly modulate the extent to which cognitive diﬃculties are
manifest in behaviour. This could be regarded as a form of external
compensation (derived from external sources rather than those internal
to the individual), which we here deﬁne as environmental scaﬀolding.
For example, in the case of developmental dyslexia, the orthography
you have to acquire has a major eﬀect on the visibility of the phono-
logical processing diﬃculties. In languages with regular phoneme-gra-
pheme pairings (like Italian), few children are slow to learn to read,
although dyslexics can still be identiﬁed using speciﬁc cognitive tasks
(e.g., rapid picture naming). In the case of ASD, we can speculate that
environments where social rules are very explicit will make it easier for
an autistic person to know how to behave socially, thereby facilitating
compensation. Equally, the environment may serve to impede or dis-
rupt compensation; for example, increasing demands in the environ-
ment may outstrip compensatory capacity at particular points in de-
velopment, thereby revealing autistic traits in behaviour. The child who
had a predictable home environment tailored to their needs might be
increasingly required to interact with others at school and into higher
education and/or work. For those seeking diagnosis in adulthood, the
task of compensating may have been achievable in childhood, up until a
critical point when environmental demands (on e.g., social in-
dependence, self-care) increased substantially.
The potential for the environment to modulate compensatory pro-
cesses and thereby, the expression of symptoms, should be dis-
tinguished from the ability of the environment to promote ‘good out-
come’ for the individual, without the behavioural manifestation of
symptoms necessarily lessening. We refer to this phenomenon as en-
vironmental accommodation. This may be particularly apparent as in-
dividuals begin to self-select their environments across development
(e.g., particular academic and/or occupational settings) in order to
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match their abilities (e.g., strengths in detail processing, diﬃculties in
social interaction), a phenomenon that Johnson et al. (2015b) have
referred to as ‘niche construction’. Certain individuals may increasingly
select environments that hold non-social abilities (i.e., autistic
strengths) to a higher standard than social skills (i.e., autistic diﬃcul-
ties). Therefore, although these individuals may continue to display
typically autistic behaviours, their immediate environment or niche is
much more accommodating of these (or actually positively embraces
these), such that their subjective quality of life and mental wellbeing
are less likely to be negatively aﬀected. There may be particular so-
cieties/cultures where environmental accommodation is more likely to
take place. For example, in an environment or society where an in-
dividual does not have to read many other minds, there would be fewer
opportunities for that individual’s poor theory of mind ability to have a
detrimental eﬀect on their quality of life. Future research should aim to
highlight the diﬀerent ways in which particular environments may i)
directly interact with or modulate compensation, as well as ii) promote
good outcome, independent of compensation.
4.3. Compensation may come at a cost
The very idea of compensation implies that a secondary, perhaps
less well-suited set of cognitive resources/machinery is being used in
the absence of resources/machinery that would typically serve the
purpose. For example, domain-general resources may be used in the
absence of domain-speciﬁc (e.g., socio-cognitive) ones. If these domain-
general resources are ﬁnite (and shared with other tasks), they will
rapidly exhaust after continuous use for compensation and equally, if
they are preferentially allocated to compensation, this will be at the
expense of other tasks dependent upon these domain-general resources.
This hypothesis is in line with reports from autistic individuals them-
selves indicating that the task of ‘pretending to be normal’ during social
interaction is mentally tiring and stressful (Bargiela et al., 2016; Hull
et al., 2017). One young man with ASD, Russell Lehmann, describes the
improvements in his own autistic symptoms from childhood to adult-
hood as “stemming from nothing but grueling, demanding, exhausting
work” (personal communication).
The incidence of mental health problems amongst ‘compensated’
individuals might speak to the demanding and taxing nature of com-
pensation. For instance, additional mental health diﬃculties amongst
late diagnosed adults are the rule rather than the exception (Happé
et al., 2016; Lever and Geurts, 2016b). Geurts and Jansen (2012) found
that 53% of individuals coming for ﬁrst diagnosis in adulthood and
receiving an ASD diagnosis had previous contact with a mental health
clinic and exhibited high levels of depression and anxiety symptoms.
Additionally, Cassidy et al. (2014) reported extremely high prevalence
of suicidal ideation (66%) amongst individuals attending an adult ASD
clinic, which substantially exceeds estimated ﬁgures amongst adults
diagnosed in childhood or adolescence (e.g., Balfe and Tanta, 2010).
There are a number of possible explanations for this association be-
tween late diagnosis and heightened mental health problems. First, the
eﬀort of compensating across the lifetime might have a downstream
detrimental impact on mental health. Second, those individuals who are
more likely to compensate in the ﬁrst place might be those with addi-
tional mental health problems; for example, a more anxious individual
might be especially driven to ‘appear normal’. Lastly, but equally pos-
sible, additional mental health diﬃculties may have over-shadowed the
presentation of autistic symptoms to the extent that individuals do not
receive a diagnosis of ASD until after a lifetime of mis/partial diag-
noses.
Interestingly, additional mental health diﬃculties (e.g., anxiety) are
frequently reported amongst unaﬀected siblings of those with ASD
(Hallett et al., 2013; Shephard et al., 2017). Whether these heightened
mental health problems reﬂect a core characteristic of the BAP, an
aetiological link between ASD and other psychiatric problems, the
stressful experience of growing up with a sibling with ASD or instead,
something important about the cost of compensation to those who
transition away from the autism phenotype early in life, is an inter-
esting avenue for future research. Finally, it can be noted that residual
psychiatric diﬃculties have been reported even amongst those ‘optimal
outcome’ individuals who no longer meet diagnostic criteria for ASD
(Fein et al., 2013; Mukaddes et al., 2017).
The exact nature of the relationship between compensation and
mental health diﬃculties, such as anxiety, depression and suicidal
ideation, requires empirical clariﬁcation and in particular, a long-
itudinal approach. Importantly, distinguishing between shallow and
deep compensation should help to further our understanding of the
speciﬁc types of compensation, if any, that genuinely come at a cost to
the individual. For example, there is reason to suspect that those in-
dividuals engaging in deep compensation, which permits relatively
ﬂexible social understanding, might not necessarily be vulnerable to
subsequent mental health problems. This may particularly be the case
when individuals seek niche environments for themselves that com-
plement their array of cognitive abilities/deﬁcits (i.e., when environ-
mental accomodation takes place; see Section 4.2).
5. Potential neurocognitive mechanisms
The neurocognitive means by which compensation can be achieved
is relatively unexplored. However, investigating those cognitive factors
that have previously been associated with improved prognosis, i.e.
‘good outcome’, might be the most promising line of investigation.
Additionally, we would expect the ability to compensate to be in-
dependent from the core cognitive burden for the disorder itself
(Morton and Frith, 1994), if we are to account for the wide hetero-
geneity in the degree to which behavioural symptoms either persist or
improve. This is corroborated by studies from the literature on ASD
demonstrating that the severity of autistic symptoms in childhood is a
poor predictor of the extent to which behavioural improvements will be
made (Fountain et al., 2012; Levy and Perry, 2011). Instead, it should
be informative to explore those cognitive factors that show a substantial
degree of variance amongst individuals within the disorder group, yet
remain intact for a proportion of individuals. It is possible that the
compensatory role of these cognitive factors could be relevant trans-
diagnostically (see Ullman and Pullman, 2015) and we therefore in-
clude mention of other neurodevelopmental disorders in the examples
below.
5.1. Intellectual ability
Neurodevelopmental disorders such as ASD are not deﬁned by a
particular level of intellectual ability, spanning the whole IQ range,
from profound intellectual disability (IQ < 50) to average or above
average intelligence (IQ > 115; Charman et al., 2011). ADHD is also
suggested to be aetiologically distinct from intellectual disability, such
that diagnoses can be seen amongst populations with low, average or
high IQ (Katusic et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2011). In spite of the fact that
IQ and severity of symptoms are not intrinsically linked (i.e., a severe
symptom proﬁle can exist alongside extremely high IQ), IQ might play a
crucial role in the developmental unfolding of these disorders across the
lifetime, i.e., changes in symptoms. Indeed, higher IQ in childhood is
one of the strongest predictors of ‘good outcome’ in later life for autistic
individuals (Billstedt et al., 2005; Blumberg et al., 2016; Howlin et al.,
2004; Farley et al., 2009; Fein et al., 2013; Magiati et al., 2014). In-
terestingly, higher childhood IQ also characterises those that remit from
ADHD symptoms by young adulthood, compared to those who persist
(Cheung et al., 2016). IQ, therefore, may represent a key feature of the
propensity/ability to compensate. Indeed, in ASD, there is evidence to
suggest that greater IQ, in particular verbal IQ (Durrleman and Franck,
2015; Fisher et al., 2005; Happé, 1995), may help certain individuals to
bootstrap their limited theory of mind ability. The exact nature of the
relationship between IQ and compensation, however, requires
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clariﬁcation. It is equally possible that the propensity to compensate
early in life might drive IQ throughout development (Anderson, 2008).
For example, some early forms of compensation might facilitate social
development, thereby providing an improved learning environment for
acquiring the domain-general skills that are tapped in an IQ test. Fi-
nally, whether high IQ could support compensation across all settings is
unknown. For example, IQ might best facilitate compensation in a
shallow manner, within structured and predictable settings (e.g., an
ADOS assessment). It may or may not be suﬃcient to support deeper
compensation, in the fast-paced and unpredictable social settings of
everyday life.
Good intellectual ability is also implicated in the previously dis-
cussed examples of compensation in ASD. For example, an fMRI study
investigating neural correlates during a task of social exclusion in au-
tistic adolescents, their unaﬀected siblings and typical controls, found
that in the unaﬀected siblings only, higher IQ was associated with a
more ‘typical’ neural activation pattern (Bolling et al., 2015). The au-
thors suggest that in the face of substantial risk for ASD, higher IQ
might steer certain siblings towards typical social cognition. In terms of
the female autism phenotype, evidence suggests that those who do meet
diagnostic criteria are more likely to have poorer IQ, which tips them
over the diagnostic threshold, compared to other females with equally
high autistic traits (Dworzynski et al., 2012). Whether females are
simply less likely to come to clinical attention in the absence of addi-
tional intellectual diﬃculties due to the insensitivity of our diagnostic
instruments, or because higher IQ genuinely plays a speciﬁc role in
compensating for underlying diﬃculties is a crucial distinction to be
made by future research (e.g., by examining the impact on mental
health and quality of life).
Higher IQ also appears to be an important feature of the late diag-
nosed population. For example, Lehnhardt et al.’s (2016) study found
that males and females diagnosed in adulthood had exceptionally high
verbal and non-verbal IQ. Further, females had a signiﬁcantly greater
processing speed compared to males, as reﬂected in the Digit-Symbol-
Coding subtest of the WAIS IQ test, which the authors interpreted as a
particular compensatory advantage for females when processing and
analysing fast social cues. Finally, cross-sectional studies of adults
seeking a diagnosis in adulthood suggest that increasing age is asso-
ciated with greater intellectual ability (Happé et al., 2016) and visual
memory (Lever and Geurts, 2016b). One potential explanation of these
ﬁndings is that older adults who have compensated for longer in their
lifetime until seeking clinical support may have done so with the aid of
enhanced intellectual abilities.
5.2. Executive function
Executive function refers to a constellation of higher-order cognitive
abilities in planning, inhibition and cognitive ﬂexibility, which may be
fractionable from one another (Joseph and Tager-Flusberg, 2004). Al-
though executive dysfunction has previously been proposed to play an
aetiological role in the development of autistic symptoms (Ozonoﬀ
et al., 1991; Russell, 1997), particularly non-social symptoms (e.g.
Yerys et al., 2009), there is increasing evidence to suggest that it is not a
universal feature of ASD (Brunsdon et al., 2015; Cantio et al., 2016;
Geurts et al., 2014; Wallace et al., 2016). This has led to the suggestion
that executive dysfunction should be conceived as an individual dif-
ference amongst the autistic population, rather than as a core feature of
ASD itself (Johnson, 2012). Instead, executive function might remain
relatively intact for a proportion of autistic individuals and can there-
fore be recruited to support compensation. Indeed, Johnson et al.
(2015b) speculate that those with a double hit of ASD and executive
dysfunction might be completely stripped of compensatory resources
and thus will be the most likely to exhibit a severe behavioural proﬁle.
One can speculate about the mechanisms by which executive
function ability might facilitate compensation, particularly shallow
compensation. For example, greater ability to inhibit undesirable social
behaviours, to plan behaviours before and throughout social interac-
tion, and to be ﬂexible in potentially unpredictable social scenarios
might help to reduce observable social symptoms. There is also evi-
dence to suggest that intact executive function might be important to
those subgroups of individuals showing apparently good compensation.
For example, Troyb et al. (2014) have reported comparable executive
function ability across a range of tasks measuring inhibition, set-
shifting, planning and working memory between ‘optimal outcome’ and
typically developing individuals. Additionally, Lehnhardt et al. (2016)
found that late diagnosed females had signiﬁcantly greater executive
function ability on tasks involving cognitive ﬂexibility and processing
speed, compared with late diagnosed males, suggesting that females
who have ‘coped’ without a diagnosis until adulthood may have done so
because of their good ability to monitor and regulate their social be-
haviour. Future exploration of how executive function and/or in-
tellectual abilities might diﬀer between early and late diagnosed groups
will serve to clarify the degree to which these cognitive abilities do
indeed speciﬁcally facilitate compensation amongst females and those
at risk of late diagnosis. Moreover, the extent to which executive
function plays a speciﬁc role in compensation over and above general
intellectual ability remains to be seen. One study (Pugliese et al., 2015)
suggests that executive function ability is a stronger predictor of ‘good
outcome’ (in terms of better adaptive living skills) for autistic children
and young adults, compared to general intelligence.
5.3. Neural mechanisms
Investigation at the neural level might be informative in de-
termining the extent to which good behavioural, and possibly cognitive,
performance is underpinned by engagement of the systems used by
typically developing individuals, suggesting genuine remediation or
delayed maturation (see Table 1), or instead, alternative pathways,
suggesting compensation. There are numerous ways in which com-
pensatory processing might be reﬂected in an atypical neural signature.
First, neural compensation may be evident in extra ‘neural eﬀort’ re-
quired from the same neural network used by neurotypicals. For ex-
ample, in the ASD literature, there are examples of fMRI studies de-
monstrating hyper-activation of the so-called ‘theory of mind’ network
(medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and lateral temporal
cortices) when performing theory of mind tasks, implying that ‘social’
tasks are still solved via social means, albeit, atypically. For example,
White et al. (2014) found that even autistic adolescents who con-
sistently passed a battery of theory of mind tasks (i.e., exhibited ‘ty-
pical’ cognitive performance) demonstrated an atypical pattern of ac-
tivation of the ‘theory of mind’ network similar to those individuals
who consistently performed poorly. This latter ﬁnding highlights the
strength of combining cognitive and neuroimaging methods when in-
vestigating compensation, in particular deep compensation, where
cognitive task performance might remain intact.
Neural compensation may also be reﬂected in the recruitment of
alternative networks that either replace or support the functioning of
the dysfunctional network. Whether an alternative system could ever
fully substitute for the functioning of the ‘theory of mind’ system is yet
to be established. There is, however, evidence to support Johnson
et al.’s (2015b) proposal that the PFC is a candidate brain region for
compensatory processing, given its fundamental role in top-down co-
ordination of other cortical regions. For instance, Kaiser et al. (2010)
used fMRI whilst individuals with ASD, their unaﬀected siblings and
controls, watched biological motion. Of particular interest, they found a
unique pattern of activity, only for the unaﬀected siblings, in the su-
perior temporal sulcus and most intriguingly, the PFC, suggesting that
PFC-dependent brain activity might be characteristic of individuals at
risk of ASD, who bypass an ASD trajectory via compensation. Evidence
for recruitment of additional brain areas not otherwise used by typically
developing individuals is also found in the literature on ADHD (for a
review, see Fassbender and Schweitzer, 2009) and developmental
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dyslexia (see Section 2.3).
The alternative possibility is that, at a neural level, compensation
will be represented rather idiosyncratically, such that there is great
variability from one ‘compensated’ individual to another, reﬂecting the
numerous possible pathways to compensation. Interestingly, evidence
for this may be disorder-speciﬁc. For example, in the case of ASD,
studies measuring neural activation during theory of mind tasks con-
sistently ﬁnd either hyper-activation (see references above) or hypo-
activation (Kana et al., 2015; Lombardo et al., 2011; O’Nions et al.,
2014) of the ‘theory of mind’ network, in both children and adults with
ASD, rather than any evidence of the idiosyncratic neural patterns that
might have been predicted a priori (Happé and Frith, 2014). Finally, it
should be noted that compensation could be reﬂected in suppressed
brain activity, as suggested in the aging literature (see Grady, 2012).
It remains to be investigated by future research which of the po-
tential neural mechanisms outlined above would be the most successful
form of compensatory processing. That is to say, which would be the
most eﬃcient and eﬀective for supporting, for example, ‘typical’ social
behaviour in an ADOS assessment (i.e. shallow compensation), and
which would extend to supporting theory of mind task performance and
everyday, ﬂexible social interaction (i.e. deep compensation). We might
suspect that those individuals engaging in shallow compensation will
continue to exhibit persistent brain atypicalities that are characteristic
of ASD. However, the possibility remains that those engaging in deep
compensation may in fact demonstrate fewer ASD-relevant brain aty-
picalities compared to other autistic individuals, particularly with in-
creasing age, as compensatory strategies are reﬁned.
6. Implications of a compensation framework
Thinking about neurodevelopmental disorders within a compensa-
tion framework could have a range of implications for research and
clinical practice. First, compensation might begin to explain why chil-
dren who appear behaviourally similar in childhood (e.g., Fountain
et al., 2012) can follow divergent pathways to outcome, thus demon-
strating great heterogeneity in the degree to which their symptoms
improve, persist or worsen. Second, evidence so far suggests that
compensation might play a role in under- or mis-diagnosis in the clinic.
Diagnostic procedures for neurodevelopmental disorders, such as ASD,
continue to rely on the severity of behavioural symptoms presented to
the clinical observer. And yet, if there exists a substantial behaviour-
cognition mismatch for certain subgroups, including some females and
late diagnosed adults, the extent of an individual’s underlying socio-
cognitive diﬃculties would not necessarily be apparent in the clinic. An
individual with very limited understanding of others’ minds may on the
surface appear not suﬃciently ‘impaired’ to warrant diagnosis, espe-
cially if compensation has supported not only improved behavioural
presentation but also some level of independence (e.g., educational or
occupational success). Furthermore, even autistic individuals who
eventually achieve ‘good outcome’ and perhaps no longer meet diag-
nostic criteria for ASD, but endure persistent diﬃculties at the cognitive
level, will continue to have important support needs that may otherwise
be overlooked. Finally, those individuals that compensate suﬃciently to
sit just below the diagnostic threshold, but experience socio-cognitive
diﬃculties comparable to other diagnosed individuals, not only risk
mis-diagnosis (Rutter, 2011) but may also be the most vulnerable to
mental health problems.
Ideally, joining cognitive tasks (e.g., theory of mind tasks) and
biological markers (e.g., genetic and neural markers for ASD) with the
assessment of behaviour in the clinic would be the optimal way to
determine if individuals are compensating and as such, avoid under- or
mis-diagnosis. However, at present, this is far from straightforward. The
precise cognitive features that underpin conditions such as ASD are not
unequivocally understood. In this paper, for the purpose of illustration,
we have discussed theory of mind impairment as it is a widely reported
core deﬁcit in ASD (Happé, 2015), but there is an array of potential
cognitive (Brunsdon and Happé, 2014) and socio-cognitive (Happé
et al., 2017) atypicalities associated with ASD. Whilst we await im-
proved characterisation of these cognitive deﬁcits, as well as potential
biological markers, ascertaining compensation in the clinic may be best
done through observation of behaviour across multiple contexts that
diﬀer in social demands.
The study of compensation may also provide insight into supporting
those on the autism spectrum. For example, we may hope to boost
compensatory resources early on in individuals at risk for ASD
(Johnson, 2012). Additionally, individuals that are limited in their
compensatory ability, for instance, those with both low IQ and/or poor
executive function, may represent a particularly vulnerable subgroup of
individuals. And yet, we have here challenged the notion that com-
pensation is a universally desirable process. It may be that those sub-
groups suspected to be engaging in good compensation, particularly
shallow compensation, are also at risk for mental health problems.
Therefore, one should perhaps be cautious in universally promoting the
use of compensatory mechanisms as a means of fostering genuinely
‘good’ outcome amongst autistic individuals. Indeed, there is evidence
to suggest that our objective, neurotypical deﬁnitions of ‘good out-
come’, which dominate the literature, do not necessarily coincide with
autistic individual’s self-rated quality of life (van Heijst and Geurts,
2015). More research is needed to identify neurodiverse concepts of
‘good outcome’, and thinking about neurodevelopmental disorders
through a compensation lens may be helpful in this.
7. Limitations and outstanding questions
The impetus for deﬁning and subsequently describing compensation
in this paper was to synthesise the limited evidence so far for this
phenomenon. For the purpose of demonstration, we have focused on
one single cognitive deﬁcit (theory of mind) within one condition
(ASD), in order to explore how compensation might operate at beha-
vioural and cognitive levels. In reality, there are likely multiple cog-
nitive deﬁcits that might be compensated for in diﬀerent ways, across
numerous conditions. This latter point feeds into the issue of hetero-
geneity, which is a deﬁning feature of ASD. There may truly exist sub-
groups of individuals who i) genuinely remit from ASD and its cognitive
characteristics (as suggested by Fein et al., 2013), or ii) follow a more
benign trajectory of the condition, thereby promoting good outcome via
some mechanism other than compensation (e.g., delayed maturation).
Further research will be required to detect the subtle but qualitative
diﬀerences between these possible subgroups and their aetiological
bases/biomarkers. In Table 1 we have outlined hypothetical distinc-
tions between compensation (both shallow and deep) and the other
mechanisms that might promote improved outcome. Most importantly,
alternative explanations to compensation will only be plausible if there
is good evidence to suggest that stable underlying diﬃculties no longer
exist, which, as outlined earlier, will require sensitive cognitive probes.
Ultimately the most robust method to address this question will be a
longitudinal developmental approach.
The notion of compensation also poses intriguing questions about
mechanisms underlying various interventions for neurodevelopmental
conditions. For example, we can ask whether such interventions are
attempting to genuinely alleviate core diﬃculties or whether they are in
fact trying to promote a layer of compensation, which supports the
individual to reach a more neurotypical outcome. In the case of inter-
ventions aimed at improving social skills during childhood/adoles-
cence, it seems that these may be targeting shallow compensation; for
example, explicitly teaching individuals rules for how to make and
maintain eye contact, initiate conversation and behave appropriately in
particular social scenarios. This form of training is likely inﬂexible and
there is evidence for failure to generalise (for a review, see Fletcher-
Watson et al., 2014). Early intensive interventions, however, (e.g.,
Early Start Denver Model, Dawson et al., 2010; Focused Playtime In-
tervention, Kasari et al., 2014), where there is an intention to rebuild
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the developmental components thought to be altered in ASD, such as
joint attention and imitation, could be seen as aiming to alleviate the
core features of the condition. Investigating neural markers may be
helpful in uncovering whether such interventions are achieving com-
pensation or instead, are addressing the core underlying cognitive
deﬁcits. Research so far on ‘optimal outcome’ following early intensive
Applied Behavioural Analysis or ABA, suggests that brain functionality
amongst these individuals still more closely resembles that of autistic
rather than neurotypical individuals (e.g., Eigsti et al., 2016), thus
suggesting compensation rather than genuine remediation.
8. Conclusions
The concept of compensation in neurodevelopmental disorders has
received strikingly little theoretical or empirical consideration. We
aimed to derive a transdiagnostic working deﬁnition of compensation in
neurodevelopmental disorders, drawing inferences from the literature
on developmental dyslexia, in order to i) review evidence for compen-
sation in ASD and ii) develop a primary theoretical framework to guide
future investigation of compensation. We deﬁne compensation as the
processes contributing to improved behavioural presentation of a neurode-
velopmental disorder, despite persisting core deﬁcit(s) at cognitive and/or
neurobiological levels. From the ASD literature we highlighted four in-
stances where compensation might be taking place: good outcome, at-
risk individuals transitioning away from the autism phenotype, late
diagnosis and female autism presentation. Interestingly, these examples
of compensation are likely to be relevant to other neurodevelopmental
phenotypes, in particular ADHD, where there is also evidence for het-
erogeneity in outcome (Agnew-Blais et al., 2016; Steinhausen, 2009),
at-risk siblings buﬀering against ADHD presentation (Johnson et al.,
2015a), ﬁrst diagnosis/emergence in adulthood (Caye et al., 2016) and
under-diagnosis in females (Quinn and Madhoo, 2014).
On considering compensation in the ASD literature, we have hy-
pothesised about a number of additional characteristics of compensa-
tion that we hope will act as a useful spring board for future research
into the phenomenon, both in ASD and other neurodevelopmental
disorders: i) compensation may be shallow or deep, ii) compensation is
modulated by the environment, and iii) compensation may come at a
cost. Additionally, we have speculated about potential cognitive abil-
ities (e.g., intellectual ability, executive function) and neural patterns
that might drive or reﬂect compensatory mechanisms across develop-
ment. Finally, we have considered the potential utility of reframing
neurodevelopmental disorders from a compensation perspective in
order to advance research and clinical knowledge concerning hetero-
geneity, mis- or under-diagnosis and the high prevalence of co-morbid
mental health problems in neurodevelopmental disorders. Ultimately,
we have provided a framework from which novel hypotheses about
compensation in these conditions can be tested. We propose that
compensation is best viewed as a mismatch between behaviour and
cognition, that its measurement will require both accurate behavioural
and cognitive probes and ﬁnally, that investigation at the neural level
might begin to answer questions about some of the most sophisticated
forms of compensation that are hidden at the cognitive level.
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